Introduction
The recent adoption of the partial agreement on illicit drugs reached at the meetings being held in Havana between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, and the Colombian Government marked a step by the Contracting Parties towards the complete elimination of both coca and drug trafficking in Colombian territory. The illegal drug economy in Colombia has grown significantly over the last few decades, to the point of producing, inter alia, a fearsome concentration of land ownership by drug traffickers in what is referred to as Colombia's 'counter-land reform', as a result of the accumulation of illegal funds 2 . Existing domestic laws in Colombia, such as Law no. 30 of 1986 known as the 'National Narcotics Statute' (Estatuto Nacional de Estupefacientes -ENE), purely a tool of control and repression without any preventive and rehabilitative purposes, and Decree no. 1188 of 1974 which increased the sanctions for trafficking and criminalized use, have appeared unequal to the task of eradicating this vicious commerce 3 .Awakened to the necessity for concerted and more effective action to rein in the drug cartels, the Colombian Government and the FARC rebels began work in 2010 on an international agreement that would establish a set of guidelines to be applied by the two parties in suppressing illicit trafficking and achieving the enforcement of illegal crop substitution projects.
Adopted as part of a wider strategy for peace and at the fiftieth anniversary of the start of FARC's war against the Colombian Government in May 2014, the provisional agreement on illicit drugs between FARC rebels and the Colombian Government is aimed at establishing a new legal framework for the complete eradication of both drug trafficking and coca crops 4 . Explicitly recognizing that illicit trafficking is 'an international criminal activity', the Agreement introduces a different treatment for the growers of natural raw components for drugs from that of the criminal economic entities involved in the different steps of the illicit drug trade. It thus marks a path that begins with participation processes for local collectivities to make a commitment to the state to substitute illicit crops and refrain from participating in the trade of raw components derived from such crops. All producing collectivities -regardless of whether they approve or disapprove of crop replacement-will have their illicit crops eliminated, with the elimination being achieved either by the collectivities themselves or by public bodies established for this purpose. In addition to this, the Agreement also commits the Colombian Government to enacting measures so that globalcapitalistic countries, in particular the United States and the EU countries, will convert to policies to cut off demand, address use from the perspective of public health, and concentrate on fundamental rights. This is implicit in the idea, explicitly indicated in the Joint Communiqué issued on 16 May 2014, that: 'There won't be any solution to the problem of illicit drugs without the express commitment of the U.S. Government with a definitive change in their failed policy called war on drugs'.
Unlike the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which is one of the most far-reaching tools ever adopted in the sector of international criminal law, the 2014 Agreement between the FARC and Colombia neglects to approach the issue of drug trafficking in a efficient and operative way. Indeed, the language of this Agreement is rather unclear and opaque, as it fails to clarify the meaning and scope of such core expressions and notions as 'the problem of illicit drugs', 'the fight against organised crime', 'the strategy to combat asset laundering', and 'state control over the trade in inputs and precursor chemicals'. For these and other reasons, such as the wording that 'If we understand drug cartels as mafias that manage international trafficking routes, then the FARC is not the big cartel that the authorities make them out to be' 5 , the Agreement can only be seen as a contribution of little significance in the battle against illicit substances.
After some remarks on the Colombian drug war, on the policy and legal arguments for classifying the Colombian armed conflict as a non-international armed conflict (NIAC), and on the reasons leading up to the drafting of an international agreement on illicit drugs between the FARC and Colombia in 2014, this paper briefly reviews the most important terms of this provisional agreement, from an international legal perspective. As one of the biggest producers of psychotropic substances and narcotic drugs on the globe, Colombia has achieved broad experience in developing law enforcement instruments against drug cartels and drug traffickers, including FARC rebels. But this experience does not arise from the final text of the Agreement. However, most of the provisions of the 2014 Agreement reflect regulatory approaches and devices already present both in the international drug control system and in the repressive drug policies of the last decades of the twentieth century in Latin America (though not in the most recent OAS Position on Drugs) 6 . For this and other reasons, the Agreement between the FARC and Colombia, which is based on prohibition, does not consider the significant amount of progress achieved in processes, which currently constitutes a critical mass towards a regulation set-up, to use Ricardo Vargas's own words 7 . These processes (again to use Ricardo Vargas's own words) include the drafting of new operative core terms paralleling elimination of drug crops, prohibition and enforcement, as well as the drafting of harm reduction schemes based on the idea that psychotropic substances and narcotic drugs must be accepted as a reality to be lived with, while avoiding or reducing the harm that psychotropic substances and drugs can cause to users and public health 8 . 5 'Las FARC y las drogas', El Tiempo, 27 February 2014, http://www.eltiempo.com/opinion/columnistas/ gustavoduncan/las-farc-y-las-drogas-gustavo-duncan-columnista-el-tiempo-_13569875-4 (last accessed 21 . This is evident if one considers that, since that time, the United States has treated the fight against drug traffickers in Colombia and elsewhere as essentially a police issue, supplying equipment and other aid to the police for counternarcotics efforts. However, since the early 2000s, the United States' approach has been to provide this assistance directly to the Colombian Government. Even more significantly, in addition to being militarized (the US shift to supporting the armed forces rather than the police), the fight against drug traffickers has also begun to privatize. The US Departments of State and Defense have contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) in particular to offer logistics support for reconnaissance airplanes and maintain an up-to-date intelligence database.
Of special relevance to our investigation is the FARC's participation in Colombia's illegal drug trade. In this regard, it is worth stressing that the FARC has long defended its practice of boosting coca cultivation and then taxing drug producers for defending their crops on the grounds that peasants in remote zones have no real alternatives for living their existence. Control over coca cultivation in Colombia aided the FARC in expanding its social base. Moreover, it has also led the Colombian Defence Minister, Juan Carlos Pinzón, to note that the FARC was involved in drug trafficking 'at every level'. Nevertheless, the FARC is not yet involved in the most lucrative downstream features of the drug trade: retail distribution in consumer countries. In other words, within the illegal drug industry's division of labour, the FARC's strength lies in retaining control over coca growers in southern Colombia, and in the defence its affiliates can offer to drug traffickers through its status as the last remaining illegal armed entity with a national standing in Colombia.
Policy and Legal Arguments for Classifying the Colombian Drug War as a NIAC
Our starting point here is that the Colombian conflict can be characterized as an armed conflict due to the presence of numerous guerrilla movements and paramilitary groups with responsible command controlling some portions of Colombian territory, and to the intensity of violence against civilians and the Colombian state. In particular, the intensity of violence justifies this statement. This is because some important triggers considered in the classification of an armed conflict are its intensity, duration and scope 12 .
Looking at the Colombian situation, the so called Colombian drug war, through the international humanitarian law (IHL)'s most classical distinction of armed conflicts into 'international armed conflict (IAC)' and 'non-international armed conflict (NIAC)', it is not difficult to conclude that the situation in Colombia resembles a NIAC 13 . More precisely, this situation resembles a specific type of NIAC, that is 'internal armed conflict, including one or more foreign interventions' 14 Incidentally, it is worth recalling that though the possibility of internationalizing a conflict is widely accepted in international jurisprudence, the same jurisprudence remains divided on the issue of what degree of control by one state over the parties acting internally in another state is required to internationalize a NIAC. See e.g. A. Perret, above no. 15 (stressing that prior to Tadić, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) did not attribute the acts of the contras -the various rebel groups opposing Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front -to the United States, because the control the state exercised over them was not comparable to the control that the United States would exercise over its of the Provisional Agreement between FARC and Colombia on Illicit Drugs Araucaria or not an armed conflict is international or non-international is fundamental for establishing the extent to which international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to a situation 15 -is suggested by the fact that the privatization of cooperation between the United States and Colombia, the so-called 'Plan Colombia', which allowed the United States Government to fight against drug cartels in Colombia, worked as a source of internationalization of the Colombian conflict 16 . This has been particularly evident since the early 2000s, when the US Departments of State and Defense hired a wide number of private military and security companies (PMSCs) to lead activities to aid the Colombian police and army 17 . Moreover, that the Colombian conflict is to be classified as a de jure armed conflict to which international humanitarian law (IHL) applies is indirectly confirmed by the scope of the conflict between the Colombian authorities and domestic drug traffickers, which has obliged the Colombian Government to respond not only with law enforcement but also with military forces in an escalating conflict. 18 In fact, the nature of both the Colombian war and the corresponding military response has transformed this conflict from a simple criminal activity to an armed conflict (that is a NIAC), subject to the law governing armed conflicts, and the accompanying human rights provisions in particular. This is despite the fact that, according to a traditional communis opinio, the laws of armed conflicts were not applicable to a NIAC unless an established state recognized the belligerency of the non-state entity.
19 But this approach radically changed over time, since the international community own state actors. As a result, the ICJ held that the Nicaraguan armed conflict was not internationalized and instead remained a NIAC). 15 In most circumstances, the only IHL applicable in a NIAC is Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, whereas all of IHL applies in a NIAC. 16 accepted that: '[w]hat is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife'. 20 In other words, the laws of armed forces evolved and enacted a more humanistic attitude, and international humanitarian law is currently the main law utilized when referring to armed conflicts 21 . However, a very different conclusion, namely the classification of the Colombian conflict as a pure NIAC, could be inferred from the fact that PMSCs contracted by the United States supplied services such as fumigation of illegal coca cultivation and intelligence without direct and strict control by the United States Government 22 . However, there are numerous cases of a US PMSC's de facto participation in the Colombian internal conflict 23 . This is despite the fact that in purely legal terms, US PMSCs are not to be involved in hostilities, since the US Congress has forbidden all activities involving close and direct participation in the Colombian conflict 24 . In this regard, it is sufficient to recall, as exemplary of this de facto participation, the activities of DynCorp. The US State Department contracted DynCorp to fumigate the illegal cultivation of coca plants in southern and central Colombia. Although fumigation comprised the main content of the contract between DynCorp and the US State Department, the presence of DynCorp contractors in the combat helicopters that generally accompanied the planes that dropped the glyphosate, and their participation in repelling attacks, was significant 25 . This is confirmed by statistics: between 2001 and 2002 (just one year after the start of DynCorp's fumigation contract), nearly 10 aircraft attacks per month occurred, increasing in 2003 to reach a peak of 70 attacks per month 26 . The use of force inherent in these helicopter missions led to the conclusion that these PMSCs were involved 
Why an Agreement on Illicit Drugs Between the FARC and Colombia?
One might be tempted to answer this question by asking why Colombia, unlike the vast majority of the states of the world, is not part of the International drug control system. In particular, unlike Peru and Bolivia, Colombia has only signed, but has not ratified, the 1988 U.N. Convention on Illicit Drug Trafficking and Psychotropic Substances (C.I.D.T.) 28 .While there are obvious reasons for this at first, others are less obvious and are to be reported. Of course, there is the obvious difficulty for a top drug trafficking country like Colombia to adhere to the prohibition-oriented UN drug control system 29 . This is evident if one considers that Colombia is the major illicit producer and supplier of cocaine and marijuana to the United States and other drug markets. Again, this is also clear if one considers that, unlike Bolivia and Peru, which grow the world's supply of the coca leaf crop, Colombia synthesizes the natural coca leaf into cocaine and provides transport services. 27 According to the ILC, there are certain circumstances in which the wrongful act of a foreign organ, such as a PMSC, can be attributed to its home state. These circumstances arise when the foreign organ continues to act as part of, and under the auspices of, the home state, and when there is no real functional link established with the beneficiary state. In the context of the Colombian conflict, wrongful conduct by US PMSCs may be attributable to the United States government if the PMSCs are acting in the service of the United States government, rather than the Colombian government. On this issue, see e.g. A Perret, above n. 22 More precisely, the cocaine base that is produced in Peru and Bolivia is exported through Colombia to the global drug markets.
But, having stated this, it would be wrong to affirm that the perplexities associated with the various criticisms of the United Nations and the drug control bodies for keeping the international drug system unchanged in face of fundamental rights breaches by the Contracting States in the so-called 'wars on drugs' had no influence on the drafting of the 2014 Agreement. In this regard, one may take as an example the Latin American Commission on Drugs and Democracy statement, according to which: 'the search for more efficient policies, rooted in the respect for human rights, implies taking into account the diversity of national situations and emphasizing prevention and treatment' 30 . Moreover, one may recall that the adoption of UN drug treaties into internal law also brought some concerns in the eyes of the drafters of the 2014 Agreement, since some of society's most vulnerable collectivities were seriously affected by it, such as, for instance, drug addicts (who are vulnerable to discrimination) and farmers in developing countries (who grow illicit crops and generally have no economically sound alternative) 31 . Yet all this is far from surprising (at least if one considers that the prohibition approach of the UN drug control conventions has often led to the occurrence of serious and documented breaches of human rights in various countries). Self-evidently, this is mainly because the states that restrictively interpret their duties under the UN drug treaties tend to enforce laws that are beyond the treaty's requirements. However, having stated this, it must be kept in mind that the impact of the UN drug treaties on the internal policies on illicit drugs as a result of their implementation in the internal legal orders of the Contracting States was only one factor -although a considerable one-out of many. Things were further complicated, inter alia, by the fact that the international drug control framework currently faces a twofold problem: while on the one hand some countries operate, to the extent that human rights are breached, with repressive drug supervisory legislation and enforcement, other countries follow liberal drug policies that have the potential to run counter to the purposes of UN drug control. In other words, summing up, the international drug control system, being a prohibition framework focused on controlling the production of narcotic drugs and psychoactive substances considered harmful to public health, has over time developed side effects that were not taken into account (at least in their magnitude) when it was created, but must now be taken into consideration by the drafters of any drug treaty or statute. But can all this on its own explains the existence of the 2014 Agreement between Colombia and the FARC on illicit drugs? The answer is no, for a number of reasons. Firstly, it would otherwise be hard, if not impossible, to explain why the 2014 Agreement's main concerns are replacement of illegal crops, the subsequent elaboration of development programmes with the involvement of local collectivities, and the enforcement of drug consumption prevention actions, instead of the supervision of the trafficking of illegal narcotic substances from Colombia to the global drug markets (like the C.I.D.T.) 32 . Second, it would be hard to understand why the suspension of aerial chemical spraying and reparations for its victims, the restructuring of the national health system and the extradition of narcotics traffickers are among the issues which remain to be resolved despite their importance in practise. Thirdly and lastly, it would be hard to understand why the abovenamed Agreement will likely have a minimal impact on the drug trade, since it fails to address the root causes of the illegal drug economy in Colombia.
'If Ya Wanna End War and Stuff, You Gotta Sing Loud'-A Survey of the Provisional Agreement between FARC and Colombia on Illicit Drugs
It is this author's opinion that at least one more reason could also be advanced to explain the existence of the 2014 Agreement between Colombia and the FARC: the relationship between drugs and peace in Colombia
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. This relationship is implicitly acknowledged by the inclusion of the subject of drugs on the agenda for the peace talks being held in Havana between FARC guerrilla leaders and the Colombian government. More precisely, it is implicitly acknowledged by the fact that issues of illicit crops, narcotic drug production and trafficking are among the major (and less undisputed) challenges for a sustainable peace in Colombia. Again, even before that, the relationship between peace and illicit drugs in Colombia is suggested by the circumstance that the Colombian Government and the FARC have been engaged in peace negotiations since 2012 and have thus far reached agreements on land reform, political participation, and illegal drugs. Moreover, that the relationship between peace and illicit drugs in Colombia can be of some use to explain the existence and contents of the 2014 Agreement between Colombia and FARC guerrilla leaders is indirectly confirmed by the formal qualification of this Agreement as a 'partial agreement', namely as a collateral agreement to the future and final peace treaty 34 . Furthermore, and more significantly, it is indirectly confirmed by the circumstance that 'a political settlement without the drugs issues as a key point in the negotiations agenda is inconceivable' 35 . Lastly, it is indirectly confirmed by the classification of the Colombian conflict as a NIAC, a conflict arising between a sovereign state and a non-state actor.
Rebus sic stantibus, it remains to be seen whether the Agreement between the Colombian Government and FARC guerrilla leaders on illicit drugs could operate as a useful tool for ending the 'war drug' in Colombia.
Summary of Provisions
As adopted, the 2014 Agreement calls upon the two Contracting Parties to enact specific enforcement measures to increase their ability to address illicit coca crops and prosecute those who are involved in drug trafficking across the Colombian borders. Such measures include setting up a specialized Truth Commission to investigate the global cartels of illicit drug dealers, award compensation to victims of aerial spraying with chemical agents, prompt suspension of aerial spraying with chemical agents, demilitarize the territories and anti-drug policies, identify, persecute and expropriate drug dealers' assets, enact special measures against corruption produced by narco-paramilitarism, and recognize the use of psychoactive drugs as a public health issue.
In addition, the Agreement prescribes recognizing and improving the licit uses of coca, poppy and marijuana, and imposes special protections on the producers of coca leaves and the users of illicit drugs. It is also demanded that the FARC and Colombia adopt effective measures to eradicate illicit cultivation of plants containing narcotic or psychotropic components, cooperate in eradicating illicitly cultivated crops, and enact measures aimed at ending or diminishing illicit demand.
Lastly, as part of the democratic reorganization of the Colombian state, and as a response to the obsolescence of the current institutions of anti-drug policy that focus on counterinsurgency approaches and are subordinated to US anti-drug policy, a new institutional regulation is foreseen to meet the purposes and actions included in the set of proposals elaborated by the EP, regarding the fourth item on the Agenda, 'Solution to the problem of illicit drugs'. The development of the new institutions will be the responsibility of the 'Commission for the design and monitoring of a sovereign, democratic and participatory national anti-drug policy'.
Addressing Illicit Crops
Point 2 of the Agreement (also known as the second sub-proposal of the Joint Communiqué of 16 May 2014) requires developing and enforcing the 'National Program for the substitution of illicit uses of coca, poppy and marijuana crops'. The rationale behind this statement is clear and straightforward: the idea that the main reasons for the growth of the illicit traffic in coca leaf and marijuana are socioeconomic, and lie in the poverty of displaced persons from the countryside, planters, and indigenous groups. In more general terms, the rationale behind the underlying approach in point 2 is the perception that measures to reduce production in the initial phases of the drug chain will lead to a diminution in supply. This is consistent with the initially-agreed aim of finding 'a definitive solution to the problem of illicit drugs'.
To the contrary, less clear, and open to dispute, is why the territorial approach that the Agreement enacts is not based on an integrated view of the territory, but is reduced to the coca situation. This is particularly the case when one considers that point 2 also provides that: 'The policy for the substitution of the illicit uses of crops aims to favor an approach of comprehensive civil, political, economic, social, cultural and human rights over policy of interdiction or prohibition, persecution, stigmatization and criminalization', as well as: '... the improvement of the living conditions of workers of coca, poppy and marijuana crops'. Moreover, it is far from clear and understandable why the possibility of using land seized from drug cartels as a way to give farmers a more feasible alternative -for reasons of location, soil quality and access to markets-was not even contemplated in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué 36 . These 'core' or 'covered' statements under point 2 are the cornerstone of the new Agreement, and are clearly linked to the FARC rebels' Marxist political designs of radically challenging imperialist capitalism in Colombia 37 . Many of the other provisions in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué, for instance those relating to the 'broadest possible amnesty' for the political crime of rebelling against the state and for the so called 'connected crimes' (but not for 36 38 and to a good living for peasant communities and families, and the provisions on the prevalence of human rights with regard to the policies of substitution of illicit uses of crops, and on compensation and incentives for producing communities and workers, are keyed to these statements.
Closely linked to point 2, point 6 of the Agreement states that: 'Contracting Parties are required to take necessary steps to demilitarise territories and anti-drug policies'. This statement, which is in line with the FARC-EP's transformation into a legal political entity, is complemented by other statements concerning the non-intervention, autonomy and self-determination of antidrug policies. Moreover, and more significantly, it is complemented by the prescription (again in point 6) of a programme to decriminalize producers and workers, as well as narcotics consumers. From all this and other evidence, it may then be safely concluded that point 6 is a self-enforcing and self-executing provision. In fact, unlike the majority of other points in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué, point 6 is comprised largely of fully self-executing statements. Specially exemplary in this regard is the statement that foresees the end of the governmental strategies to bring a state presence to rural and conflicted areas, the so called 'National policy for territorial consolidation' (PNCRT) and 'Territorial consolidation plans' 39 .
Addressing Drug Trafficking
It has been correctly observed that the Agreement/Joint Communiqué has addressed the issue of drug trafficking in an extremely generalized manner. There is considerable evidence of this, but prominent here is the failure to provide for adequate mechanisms for the monitoring, detection, retrieval and confiscation of drug-related laundered funds and assets (perhaps with the sole notable exception of the 'Independent Commission of Truth on the transnational capitalist enterprise of drug-trafficking'). Other evidence concerns the absence of control measures to prevent drug traffickers from obtaining secure identity documents or counterfeiting them. Moreover, further evidence arises from the lack of appropriate budgetary funds for drug supervision and crime prevention in the Agreement/Joint Communiqué. Lastly, additional evidence may be found in the language of the Agreement/ Joint Communiqué, which is far too imprecise and vague, as it fails to clarify the meaning of such key expressions as 'the fight against organized crime', 'the strategy to combat asset laundering', 'state control over the trade in inputs and precursor chemicals', 'state control on capital flows, financial regulations and special audits', 'the special measures and actions against corruption produced by narco-paramilitarism' and, lastly, the reiteration that asset forfeiture procedures will be 'effectively applied' 40 . Similar considerations also apply, Mutatis mutandis, to the 'Special Jurisdiction for Peace' ('SJP'), which is to be composed by two sections or chambers (the Tribunal for Peace and the Chambers of Justice). Although it is clear that this jurisdiction will operate as a separate jurisdiction not subject to normal rules, it is not clear whether it will be a temporary body in Colombia's justice system. Unfortunately, this issue is not clarified by the Agreement/Joint Communiqué and remains an open one, although the temporary character of the SJP could be (but with no certainty!) inferred from its institutional mission to obtain truth, do away with impunity, contribute to victims' reparations, and to judge, prescribe and lay down sanctions for those allegedly responsible for serious crimes taking place during the armed conflict, and the most serious and representative ones in particular. Again, this is even though the SJP's temporary nature could be considered as implicitly suggested by the SJP's requirements to receive reduced sentences and 'special treatment', provide reparations to victims, and guarantee non-repetition of their acts.
Going on briefly now to recall the way in which the Agreement/Joint Communiqué deals with the problem of drug use, we find that its references to drug use are far too generic, characterized in particular by a failure to differentiate between drug use and abuse (or problem drug utilization), or between different substances as a key element in dealing with the issue. This is despite the fact that some clarity as to the issue of recreational use and abuse of drugs should have been considered as compulsory by the drafters of the Agreement/Joint Communiqué. Again, and more specifically, this is despite the fact that some clarity around this issue would have been of strategic relevance in marking the legal boundaries between drug abuse and addiction. 'If Ya Wanna End War and Stuff, You Gotta Sing Loud'- on drug policies 43 . For its part, the FARC has agreed 'to put to an end any relation that, in its efforts to promote the rebellion, it may have had with this phenomenon' of drug trafficking 44 . Finally, international cooperation on drugs issues has been more illusory than real, as appears in particular from the lack of a strategic approach to the issue of drug trafficking, including the seeking of commitments from other countries and guerrilla groups to rethink the present policy on narcotic drugs.
